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procedure followed) ahead of the individual citizen's right not to have
his privacy invaded. In doing so, it rejected judicial precedent for ju-
dicial expediency. Had the Court taken the cases cited and attempted
to arrive at a conclusion within their boundaries, then the decision of
the court of appeals would have been upheld.
Ronald Carl Weingrad
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY ABOLITION OF SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY-CITY NOT LIABLE FOR GOOD FAITH ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE
LATER HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL-The Court of Appeals of
Washington has held that liability for damages against a municipality
must be predicated upon the tortious conduct of the municipality, and
that the good faith enactment of an ordinance is a legislative act which
cannot be characterized as tortious, no matter how mistaken or unwise
the municipality's legislative action may have been.
J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d
600 (1972).
The appellant, the operator of a sauna massage parlor, commenced
an action to have declared unlawful a city ordinance' regulating the
operation of massage parlors to restrain the city from enforcing the
ordinance and to seek damages for interfering with the operation of
his business. The court held that the ordinance, which prohibited
massagists not licensed under one of the other healing arts2 from per-
forming massages upon the opposite sex, constituted an unreasonable
exercise of police power that went beyond the objective of protecting
the public from lewd acts in sauna massage parlors. 3 The court further
held that the ordinance was unduly oppressive to massagists and their
patients and constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in contra-
1. Lacey, Wash., Ordinance 139, April 23, 1970.
2. 18 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.01-.104.920 (1971) (relates to businesses or professions, but
massage or massotherapy is not specifically included in the healing arts covered in those
sections although it is utilized in varying degrees by several classifications which are
licensed).
3. J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1972). The
acts complained of in this case were that sexually provocative advertising was carried in
the classified advertising columns of the Daily Olympian, that masseuses wore mini-skirts
and low cut blouses, and talked and acted in a sexually provocative manner. For a fee of
twenty dollars, undercover agents received what the police chief modestly referred to as
a "lower abdominal massage."
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vention of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.4 The court, however, did not decide
the claim for damages by the appellant against the city.
Upon rehearing of the damage action the court reasoned that even
if legislation is held to be unconstitutional, public policy and good gov-
ernment require that a legislative body be free to enact good faith legis-
lation without incurring tort liability. Therefore, the court dismissed
the appellant's damage claim. Although not explicitly discussed, the
court, by implication, relied heavily on the Washington statute5 abol-
ishing sovereign tort immunity. This is apparent from its citing of
Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State,6 wherein it was
held that the statute abolishing governmental immunity did not apply
to discretionary acts of officials charged with implementing state policy.
At-common law the doctrine of sovereign immunity developed from
the idea that the King can do no wrong.7 It was felt that it was a con-
tradiction of the King's sovereignty to allow him to be sued as a matter
of right in his own courts.8 As the common law concept of sovereign
immunity evolved, there developed a distinction between governmen-
tal and proprietary functions.9 Certain functions and activities that
could only be adequately performed by the government were said to
be governmental in character and immune from tort liability.10 On
the other hand, when the city performs a service which might be pro-
vided as competently by private corporations, and particularly when it
collects revenue from it, the function is considered a proprietary one,
for which tort liability may exist."
The Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna decision, wherein
the court first interpreted the Washington statute 12 abolishing sover-
eign tort immunity, engrafted the words "discretionary act'1 3 into the
4. Id. at 54, 492 P.2d at 607.
5. Ch. 159, § 2, [1961] Wash. Sess. Laws, as amended 4 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090(1971) (emphasis added) read in part: The State of Washington, whether acting in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or
action against it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it
were a private person or corporation .. . .4 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (1971) (emphasis
added) provides: The State of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or propi-
etary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same
extent as if it were a private person or corporation.
6. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246.
8. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 135 (1926).
9. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
10. Bean v. City of Moberly, 350 Mo. 975, 169 S.W.2d 393 (1943).
11. Shandrow v. City of Tacoma, 187 Wash. 389, 62 P.2d 1090 (1936).
12. 4 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.090 (1971).
13. See 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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language of the statute despite the words of the act containing no such
limiting terms, but rather stated that the state of Washington, whether
acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, will be liable for its
tortious conduct. In states where statutes14 or case law15 abrogate munic-
ipal and other governmental immunity in the broadest terms, courts
have held that certain types of governmental activity must remain free
from any resulting damage claim because they are viewed as inherently
non-tortious or are otherwise deemed immune for important policy
reasons. The Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach'6 abrogated its prior decision permitting municipal immunity
and allowed a wrongful death action against the city. The court, how-
ever, stated that the abrogation would not impose liability on the mu-
nicipality in the exercise of legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or
quasi-judicial functions.17 In Spanel v. Mounds View School District8
the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished sovereign tort immunity but
said that it did not suggest that discretionary acts, as distinguished from
ministerial activities, judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legisla-
tive functions, may not continue to have the benefit of the rule.
In the states of Washington and New York the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been broadly abolished by statute. However, as noted
above, the Washington courts have placed limits on this abolition that
are not stated in the statute. Similarly, a New York court in Weiss v.
Fote'9 placed limits on the broad statutory abolition of sovereign im-
munity. In Weiss v. Fote,20 the court held that to prefer a jury's verdict
as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental services
over the judgment of a governmental body that originally considered
and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental
operations.
Congress in the Federal Tort Claims Act 21 provided for tort claims
against the federal government but specifically excluded claims based
on acts or omissions of governmental employees exercising due care in
the execution of a statute or regulations, whether or not such statute
14. N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8 (McKinney 1964); 4 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (1971).
15. See Muskoff v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
16. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
17. Id. at 133.
18. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
19. 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
20. Id. at 585-86, N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
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or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform discretionary functions or duties.
Similarly, in 1965, Nevada waived its immunity but retained non-lia-
bility as to discretionary functions.22 A 1963 California statute23 pro-
vides that there will be no liability for action taken in good faith under
the apparent authority of an enactment that is unconstitutional and in-
valid or inapplicable. A 1965 Illinois statute24 provides that good faith
action under an invalid enactment is immune to the same extent it
would be if the enactment had been valid.
It is suggested that the court's result in J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. is
in full accord, not only with judicial precedents, but also with modern
legislative trends. Courts, as noted above, have uniformly refused to
impose liability on a municipality in the exercise of its legislative or
judicial functions. 25 It would appear that the good faith enactment of
legislation is a governmental function that is imperative to enable gov-
erning bodies to govern conscientiously for the public interest with-
out the fears and burdens of pending litigation.
It is suggested that further case development will be necessary to de-
termine what the court will consider good faith legislation for which
the municipality is immune from tort liability. It is foreseeable that
the court will be presented with questions concerning statutes that are
directly aimed at the suppression of the rights of dissident or unpopular
individuals or groups. No case law exists to guide the courts in defining
what is legislation enacted in good faith. It is hoped that the courts in
those states that have abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will not develop a test defining good faith that holds that the King can
do no wrong-at least while legislating.
Joseph A. Woehrel
22. 41 NEV. REV. STAT § 41.032 (1969).
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815.2, 820.6 (West 1965).
24. I.. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 2-109, 2-203 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
25. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (dissenting opinion); 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.12 (1958).
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